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1 Introduction
The sequential joint maximization method was proposed by Rutherford [10] as a heuristic
procedure for applied equilibrium problems. It turned out to be eective in applications
to rather complex intertemporal equilibrium models for integrated assessment of interna-
tional environmental policies (see Manne [6], Manne and Rutherford [7]). In the present
paper we analyze some convergence properties of the method. We consider the case of
Cobb-Douglas utility functions which allow to illustrate the main features of the procedure
in the most simple manner. For example, it is shown that convergence of the joint max-
imization method is related to new problems for inhomogeneous Markov processes. We
also illustrate the convergence of the method without requiring the gross substitutability
assumptions.
2 General equilibrium problem
Let us introduce some necessary notations. Consider an economy consisting of m con-
sumers and l producers. Each consumer k is characterized by a utility function U(x
k
),
consumption vector x
k
2 Q
k
 R
n
, initial endowment w
k
2 R
n
+
and shares 
ki
in prots
of producer i,
P
m
k=1

ki
= 1. Producer i is characterized by the set of feasible activity
vectors y
i
2 Y
i
 R
n
and a production vector-function g
i
(y
i
) = (g
i1
(y
i
); : : : ; g
in
(y
i
)). Let
p 2 R
n
+
denote a price vector of goods in the economy, x = (x
1
; : : : ; x
m
), y = (y
1
; : : : ; y
l
),
Q = Q
1
 : : :Q
m
, Y = Y
1
 : : : Y
l
.
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Demand for goods in the economy is generated according to the principle of utility
maximization: it is assumed that each consumer k chooses a vector y
+
k
of goods that
maximizes his/her utility subject to a budget constraint (2) and others, for example,
environmental constraints (3):
U
k
(x
k
)  ! max
x
k
; (1)
px
k
 I
k
(y; p); (2)
x
k
2 Q
k
2 R
n
; (3)
where income function I
k
(y; p) has the form:
I
k
(y; p) = pw
k
+
l
X
i=1

ki
pg
i
(y
i
);
m
X
k=1

ki
= 1; (4)
where pg
i
(y
i
) denotes an inner product of vectors p and g
i
(y
i
). This approach allows
to generate an arbitrary number of demand functions x
k
(I
k
; p) by choosing appropriate
utility functions U
k
(x
k
).
Producer i chooses the production levels y
i
from the prot maximization:
pg
i
(y
i
)  ! max
y
i
; (5)
y
i
2 Y
i
 R
n
: (6)
We also consider a "market player" (see Zangwill and Garcia [12]):
p(
m
X
k=1
x
k
 
m
X
k=1
w
k
 
l
X
i=1
g
i
(y
i
))  ! max
p
; (7)
p  0;
n
X
j=1
p
j
= 1: (8)
Vectors x

, y

and p

constitute a general equilibrium if vectors x

k
are solutions of (1)-
(3) for xed p = p

, y = y

, k = 1; : : : ;m; y

i
is a solution of (5)-(6) for xed p = p

,
i = 1; : : : ; l, and p = p

is a solution of (7)-(8) for xed x = x

, y = y

, i.e. the following
material and nancial balances are fullled:
m
X
k=1
x

k
 W +G(y

); (9)
p

m
X
k=1
x

k
= p

(W +G(y

)); (10)
where W =
P
m
k=1
w
k
, G(y) =
P
l
i=1
g
i
(y
i
) (component-wise summation). Thus a general
equilibriumx

; y

; p

is in fact a Nash equilibriumof the appropriate game with (m+l+1)
players.
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We use some common assumptions:
(i) utility functions U
k
(x
k
) are concave and continuous on Q
k
;
(ii) sets Q
k
are closed and convex, 0 2 Q
k
 R
n
+
;
(iii) production functions g
ij
(y
i
) are concave, i = 1; : : : ;m; j = 1; : : : ; n;
(iv) sets Y
i
, i = 1; : : : ; l; are convex compacts, Y
i
 R
n
+
;
(v) for any product j = 1; : : : ; n there exist activity vectors y
i
2 Y
i
such that W
j
+
G
j
(y) > 0.
Let us note that the case of nonlinear functions g
i
(y
i
) (instead of traditional g
i
(y
i
) = y
i
)
is important when decomposition schemes are used (see, for example, [3]).
If utilities U
k
(), k = 1; : : : ;m; are positively homogeneous and income functions
I
k
(y; p) := t
k
, k = 1; : : : ;m, are constant, then the general equilibrium problem is re-
duced to an optimization problem (see Eisenberg and Gale [2], Gale [4], Eisenberg [1],
Polterovich [8], [9]).
Denition 2.1 Function U(x); x 2 Q; is called positively homogeneous with degree  on
a cone Q 2 R
n
if for any x 2 Q and r > 0
U(rx) = r

U(x):
The following positively homogeneous utility functions are often used:
U(x) = x

1
1
 : : : x

n
n
,
P
n
j=1

j
= 1, 0  
j
 1 (Cobb-Douglas function);
U(x) = min
1in
fx
1
=a
1
; : : : ; x
n
=a
n
g, a
j
 0 (Leontief function);
U(x) =
P
n
i=1
c
i
x
i
, c
i
 0 (linear function).
Theorem 2.1 Assume in addition to (i)-(v) that
(vi) function U
k
is positively homogeneous with degree 
k
and nonnegative on Q
k
,
set Q
k
is a cone with the vertex at the origin and contains a vector x
0
k
2 Q
k
such that
U
k
(x
0
k
) > 0, k = 1; : : : ;m;
(vii) the income function I
k
(y; p) = t
k
is constant, k = 1; : : : ;m.
Then vectors x

, y

and p

constitute an equilibrium i vectors x

k
, k = 1; : : : ;m, y

i
,
i = 1; : : : ; l; are solutions of the following optimization problem:
m
X
k=1
t
k

k
lnU
k
(x
k
)  ! max
x;y
; (11)
m
X
k=1
x
k
W +G(y); (12)
x 2 Q; y 2 Y; (13)
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and p

is a Lagrange multiplier vector corresponding to inequalities (12).
This statement is a generalization of the results by Polterovich [8], [9] to the case
of nonlinear production functions g
i
. The following proof basically repeats the proof by
Polterovich [8].
Lemma 2.1 Assume that function f(x) is concave and positively homogeneous with de-
gree  > 0, set Q is a cone with 0 2 Q, and t > 0. Then at the optimal solution of the
optimization problem
t

ln f(x)  ! max
x
; (14)
qx  t; (15)
x 2 Q; (16)
constraint (15) is fullled as equality (in the optimum) and the Lagrange multiplier cor-
responding to (budget) constraint (15) equals one.
Proof. Let x

be the optimal solution of (14)-(16). Since 0 2 Q and t > 0, then in (15)
Slater's condition is fullled. By Kuhn-Tucker theorem for any x 2 Q
t

ln f(x

) 
t

ln f(x) + (t   qx); (17)
where   0. Note that
qx

= t: (18)
Otherwise, there exists a vector rx

, r > 1, satisfying constraints (15) and (16), thereby
contradicting the optimality of x

:
f(x

) < r

f(x

) = f(rx

):
Putting in (17) x = rx

, r > 0, and using (18) and homogeneity of f we obtain
(r   1)  ln r: (19)
If r < 1 then   ln(r=(r   1)), and passing to the limit t ! 1   0 we obtain   1.
Passing in (19) to the limit t! 1 + 0 we obtain the opposite inequality   1. 2
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Proof of Theorem 2.1. Consider an equilibrium x

k
, k = 1; : : : ;m; y

i
, i = 1; : : : ; l;
and p

. Obviously, vector x

k
is a solution of the problem
t
k

k
lnU
k
(x
k
)  ! max
x
k
; (20)
p

x
k
 t
k
; (21)
x
k
2 Q
k
; (22)
By Lemma 2.1
p

x

k
= t
k
; 
k
= 1:
Using Kuhn-Tucker theorem for any x
k
2 Q
k
we have
t
k

k
lnU
k
(x

k
) 
t
k

k
lnU
k
(x
k
) + (t
k
  p

x
k
): (23)
Summing (23) over k and taking into account that p

x

k
= t
k
we obtain
m
X
k=1
t
k

k
lnU
k
(x

k
) 
m
X
k=1
t
k

k
lnU
k
(x
k
) + p

(
m
X
k=1
x

k
 
m
X
k=1
x
k
): (24)
For producers at equilibrium we have
p

g
i
(y

i
)  p

g
i
(y
i
); y
i
2 Y
i
; i = 1; : : : ; l; (25)
and hence
p

G(y

)  p

G(y); y = (y
1
; : : : ; y
l
) 2 Y: (26)
By denition of the equilibrium
p

m
X
k=1
x

k
= p

(W +G(y

)); p

 0: (27)
From (24), (26), (27) for any x
k
2 Q
k
and y we obtain
m
X
k=1
t
k

k
lnU
k
(x

k
) 
m
X
k=1
t
k

k
lnU
k
(x
k
) + p

(W +G(y) 
m
X
k=1
x
k
): (28)
Vectors x

k
, k = 1; : : : ;m, and y

i
, i = 1; : : : ; l, satisfy conditions (13). From (27), (28)
follows that these vectors form a solution to problem (11)-(13) and p

is an optimal
Lagrange multiplier vector to constraint (12).
The proof of the inverse statement proceeds as follows. Let x

k
, k = 1; : : : ;m, and
y

i
, i = 1; : : : ; l, be a solution of (11)-(13) and p

be an optimal Lagrange multiplier
corresponding to constraint (12). This means that relations (27), (28) hold true. From
5
(27), (28) for x
k
= x

k
we obtain (26) and hence (25). Then, for y
i
= y

i
we obtain (24).
Therefore
t
k

k
lnU
k
(x

k
) 
t
k

k
lnU
k
(x
k
) + (p

x

k
  p

x
k
): (29)
Taking x
k
= rx

k
after simple transformations for all r > 0
(r   1)p

x

k
 t
k
ln r: (30)
Hence
p

x

k
= t
k
: (31)
Substituting p

x

k
in (29) by t
k
we obtain (23), which jointly with (31) shows that x

k
is a
solution of problem (1)-(3) of k-th consumer. Thus consumption and production vectors
x

k
, k = 1; : : : ;m, y

i
, i = 1; : : : ; l, as well as p

satisfy equilibrium conditions (12) and
(27). 2
Parameter 
k
=
t
k

k
in (11) is called Negishi's weight of utility U
k
in the aggregated
utility
U(x
1
; : : : ; x
m
) =
m
X
k=1

k
lnU
k
(x
k
):
Consider a parametric optimization problem (11)-(13), denote its solution sets X(t),
Y (t) and optimal Lagrange multiplier set P (t) (corresponding to (12)). Now construct
the following set valued mapping:
I(t) = fz 2 R
m
jz
k
= p(w
k
+
l
X
i=1

ki
g
i
(y
i
)); k = 1; : : : ;m;
p 2 P (t); (y
1
; : : : ; y
l
) 2 Y (t)g: (32)
The next lemma connects equilibriums of model (1)-(6) with xed points of I(t).
Theorem 2.2 Suppose assumptions (i)-(vi) are fullled.
If x

; y

p

constitute an equilibrium of (1)-(6) then
t

= ft

k
= p

(w
k
+
l
X
i=1

ki
g
i
(y

k
)); k = 1; : : : ;mg (33)
is a xed point of I(t).
If t

is a xed point of I(t), i.e. t

2 I(t

), then there exist x

2 X(t

), y

2 Y (t

)
and p

2 P (t

) constituting an equilibrium of the original model (1)-(6).
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Proof. Let x

; y

; p

be an equilibrium of (1)-(6). Construct t

by (33). Now consider
optimization problem (11)-(13) with t = t

. By Theorem 2.1 x

; y

; p

belong to solutions
of (11)-(13), i.e. x

2 X(t

), y

2 Y (t

) and p

2 P (t

). Hence
t

2 I(t

) = fzj z
k
= p(w
k
+
P
l
i=1

ki
g
i
(y
k
)); k = 1; : : : ;m;
p 2 P (t

); y 2 Y (t

)g:
Now prove the reverse statement. From t

2 I(t

) and the denition of I(t) it follows
that there exist p

2 P (t

) and (y

1
; : : : ; y

l
) 2 Y (t

) such that
t

k
= p

(w
k
+
l
X
i=1

ki
g
i
(y

i
)); k = 1; : : : ;m: (34)
By Theorem 2.1 x

; y

; p

constitute an equilibrium of the original model (1)-(6), where
t

k
stands for I
k
(y; p), k = 1; : : : ;m. But due to (34) budget constraint (2) can be rewritten
in the form
px
k
 t

k
= p

(w
k
+
l
X
i=1

ki
g
i
(y

i
)):
It means that x

k
provides a solution of consumer k's problem (1)-(3) under xed p = p

and y = y

. This completes the proof. 2
3 Cobb-Douglas utilities
Notice that the aggregated utility function (11) in Theorem 2.1 is in fact a logarithm of
the following Cobb-Douglas type function
U(x) =
m
Y
k=1
U
t
k
=
k
(x
k
):
So it is natural to analyze possibilities of computational procedures rst of all in the
following case.
(viii) Assume that consumer's utility functions have Cobb-Douglas form:
U
k
(x
k
) = x

k1
k1
 x

k2
k2
 : : : x

kn
kn
; (35)
x
k
= (x
k1
; : : : ; x
kn
)  0;
where
0  
ki
 1;
n
X
i=1

ki
= 1; k = 1; : : : ;m:
7
This utility functions are positively homogeneous of degree 1.
Consider optimization problem (11)-(13) in the case of Cobb-Douglas utilities:
U

(t) = max
x;y
m
X
k=1
t
k
ln(x

k1
k1
 : : :  x

km
km
) (36)
m
X
k=1
x
k
W +G(y); (37)
x  0; y 2 Y: (38)
Lemma 3.1 In (36)-(38) an optimal production vector y

is a solution of the problem:
max
y2Y
n
X
j=1
 
m
X
k=1
t
k

kj
!
ln(W
j
+G
j
(y)): (39)
An optimal Lagrange multiplier vector p

has the form:
p

j
=
1
W
j
+G
j
(y

)
m
X
k=1
t
k

kj
; j = 1; : : : ; n: (40)
Optimal consumption x

k
; k = 1; : : : ;m; is calculated as follows:
x

kj
=
t
k

kj
p

j
; j = 1; : : : ; n: (41)
Proof. Denote p = (p
1
; : : : ; p
n
)  0 vector of Lagrange multipliers corresponding to
inequality (37). The required follows from the following assertions:
U

(t) = max
y2Y;x0
min
p0
 
m
X
k=1
t
k
lnU
k
(x
k
)  p(
m
X
k=1
x
k
 W  G(y))
!
=
max
y2Y
min
p0
0
@
m
X
k=1
n
X
j=1
max
x
kj
0
(t
k

kj
ln(x
kj
)  p
j
x
kj
) + p(W +G(y))
1
A
=
max
y2Y
min
p0
0
@
m
X
k=1
n
X
j=1
(
kj
t
k
ln
t
k

kj
p
j
  t
k

kj
) + p(W +G(y))
1
A
=
max
y2Y
0
@
n
X
j=1
min
p
j
0
 
(
X
k=1
(t
k

kj
) ln
1
p
j
+ p
j
(W
j
+G
j
(y))
!
1
A
+
m
X
k=1
n
X
j=1
t
k

kj
ln
kj
+
m
X
k=1
(t
k
ln t
k
  t
k
) =
max
y2Y
n
X
j=1
 
m
X
k=1
t
k

kj
!
ln(W
j
+G
j
(y)) 
n
X
j=1
 
m
X
k=1
t
k

kj
!
ln
 
m
X
k=1
t
k

kj
!
+
m
X
k=1
n
X
j=1
t
k

kj
ln
kj
+
m
X
k=1
t
k
ln t
k
:
2
Consider the set valued mapping I(t) in the case of Cobb-Douglas utilities.
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Lemma 3.2 In the case of Cobb-Douglas utility functions (35) the set valued mapping
I(t) has the form:
I(t) = fA(y)tj y 2 Y (t)g (42)
where t = (t
1
; : : : ; t
m
)
T
, Y (t) is a solution set of (39) and matrix A(t) = fa
pq
g
m
p;q=1
has
elements
a
pq
(t) =
n
X
j=1
w
pj
+
P
l
i=1

pi
g
ij
(y
i
)
W
j
+
P
l
i=1
g
ij
(y
i
)

qj
: (43)
Proof. By denition
I(t) = fz 2 R
m
j z
k
= p(w
k
+
P
l
i=1

ki
g
i
(y
i
)); k = 1; : : : ;m;
p 2 P (t); y 2 Y (t)g;
where Y (t) and P (t) are solutions of (36)-(38). But by Lemma 3.1 Y (t) is a solution set
for (39) and
P (t) = fp 2 R
n
j p
j
=
1
W
j
+G
j
(y)
m
X
q=1
t
q

qj
; j = 1; : : : ; n; y 2 Y (t)g:
Then for z = (z
1
; : : : ; z
p
; : : : ; z
n
) 2 I(t) we have
z
p
=
P
n
j=1
p
j
(w
pj
+
P
l
i=1

pi
g
ij
(y
i
))
=
P
n
j=1

P
m
q=1

qj
W
j
+G
j
(y)
t
q
 
w
pj
+
P
l
i=1

pi
g
ij
(y
i
)

=
P
m
q=1

P
n
j=1
w
pj
+
P
l
i=1

pi
g
ij
(y
i
)
W
j
+G
j
(y)

qj

t
q
=
P
n
q=1
a
pq
t
q
:
2
Remark. Notice that matrix A(y) in (42) has a remarkable feature: the sum of
elements in each column of A(y) equals to 1. Indeed,
m
X
p=1
a
pq
=
m
X
p=1
n
X
j=1
w
pj
+
P
l
i=1

pi
g
ij
(y
i
)
W
j
+G
j
(y)

qj
=
n
X
j=1

qj
P
m
p=1
w
pj
+
P
l
i=1
g
ij
(y
i
)
P
m
p=1

pi
W
j
+G
j
(y)
=
n
X
j=1

qj
= 1:
4 The lack of gross substitutability
Let us now calculate the excess demand function in the case of Cobb-Douglas utilities
and for a xed (possibly zero) feasible production plan y 2 Y .
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Let p be a given price vector. Each consumer k solves the problem:
x

k1
k1
 : : : x

kn
kn
 ! max
x
k
;
px
k
 p(w
k
+
l
X
i=1

ki
g
i
(y
i
)) = pw
k
; x
k
 0;
where w
k
= w
k
+
P
l
i=1

ki
g
i
(y
i
).
By Lemma 2.1 this problem is equivalent to:
(pw
k
)
n
X
j=1

kj
lnx
kj
 
n
X
j=1
p
j
x
kj
+
n
X
j=1
p
j
w
kj
 ! max
x
k1
;:::;x
kn
0
:
Its solution is
x
kj
=
1
p
j
(pw
k
)
kj
; j = 1; : : : ; n:
Thus excess demand function f(p) = ff
j
(p)g has the following components:
f
j
(p) =
1
p
j
m
X
k=1
(pw
k
)
kj
 W
j
 G
j
(y):
Let us check the gross substitutability condition. We have
@f
j
(p)
@p
i
=
1
p
j
m
X
k=1
w
ki

kj
 0:
If, for instance, w
k
> 0 and 
k
= (
k1
; : : : ; 
kn
) > 0 for all k, then
@f
j
(p)
@p
i
> 0 for all i; j; i 6= j;
and, hence, the gross substitutability condition is satised. In this case an equilibrium in
the (exchange) economy can be found by a Walrasian ta^tonment process. But if for some
pair (i; j) it happens that
P
m
k=1
w
ki

kj
= 0 then @f
j
(p)=@p
i
= 0 and the convergence of this
ta^tonment process is not guaranteed. An advantage of the sequential joint optimization
method, as will follow from the next section, is its convergence in the absence of gross
substitutability.
Let us consider a simple numerical example.
Example. Consider an exchange economy with only two consumers and two types of
goods.
The rst consumer has utility function U
1
(x
1
) = x
12
and endowment vector w
1
=
(1; 1), i.e. he solves the problem
x
12
 ! max
x
11
;x
12
;
10
p1
x
11
+ p
2
x
12
 p
1
+ p
2
; x
11
; x
12
 0:
The second consumer has utility function U
2
(x
2
) =
p
x
21
x
22
and endowment vector
w
2
= (1; 0), i.e. he solves the problem
p
x
21
x
22
 ! max
x
21
;x
22
;
p
1
x
21
+ p
2
x
22
 p
1
; x
21
; x
22
 0:
The economy has the following equilibrium solutions:
p

= (0; 1); x

1
= (x
11
; 1); x

2
= (x
21
; 0);
where x
11
; x
21
are arbitrary, but 0  x
11
+ x
21
 2.
Excess demand functions here have the form:
f
1
(p) =  
1
2
;
f
2
(p) =
1
p
2
(
3
2
p
1
+ p
2
)  1:
Thus @f
1
(p)=@p
2
= 0 and the gross substitutability condition is not satised. The classical
Walrasian ta^tonment process dp=d = f(p) does not converge here in the sense that its
rst component goes to  1. Let us show that the sequential joint maximization method
can overcome this diculty.
5 Sequential joint maximization method
Rutherford's [10], [11] sequential joint maximization method can be viewed as an attempt
to solve the inclusion t 2 I(t) by the following sequence of vectors t
s
= (t
s
1
; : : : ; t
s
m
),
s = 0; 1; : : ::
t
0
is an arbitrary nonnegative vector,
P
m
k=1
t
0
k
= 1;
t
s+1
2 I(t
s
); (44)
t
s+1
= (1  
s
)t
s
+ 
s
t
s+1
; (45)
where I(t) is dened by (32), parameters 
s
> 0 play a role of step multipliers. If 
s
= 1
then the (full step) process has the form
t
s+1
2 I(t
s
): (46)
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An empirical result is that sequence t
s
(with some 0 <   
s
 1) converges to xed
points of I(t) (equilibrium incomes) (see Rutherford [10], [11], Manne [6], Manne and
Rutherford [7]). The corresponding equilibria of model (1)-(6) can be found as solutions
X(t), Y (t) and P (t) of optimization problem (11)-(13).
Let us analyze some convergence properties of this method in the case of Cobb-Douglas
utilities. In this case method has the form:
t
0
 0;
m
X
k=1
t
0
k
= 1; (47)
t
s+1
= ((1  
s
)E + 
s
A(y
s
))t
s
; y
s
2 Y (t
s
); s = 0; 1; : : : : (48)
Note that when starting in a simplex, i.e.
P
m
k=1
t
0
k
= 1, the method always remains within
a simplex, i.e.
P
m
k=1
t
s
k
= 1, due to the fact that the column sums of A(y) equal 1.
Let us note that if the set Y (t) is a singleton then (48) is reduced to the process
t
s+1
= A(t
s
)t
s
; ; s = 0; 1; : : : ; A(t
s
) = (1  
s
)E + 
s
A(Y (t
s
)); (49)
which generates a sequence of inhomogeneous nonnegative matrices
A(t
0
); A(t
1
); : : : ; A(t
s
); : : :
They are stochastic matrices, therefore the convergence of (48) is connected with the
convergence of the backward products
A(t
s
)A(t
s 1
) : : :A(t
0
):
The main complexity here is concerned with endogenously generated inhomogeneity of
such products by the sequence t
0
; t
1
; : : :. It leads to new challenging problems of Markov
processes. In this article we mention only some straightforward results.
Proposition 5.1 If functions G
j
(y) are strictly concave and monotonously increasing,

s
  > 0, then subsequences ft
s
l
g such that
lim
l!1
kt
s
l
+1
  t
s
l
k = 0;
converge to an equilibrium.
Proof. Notice that solution Y (t) of problem (39) with strictly concave and increasing
functions G
j
(y) is unique and continuously depends on t, the same holds for I(t). Suppose
t
s
l
 ! t

and kt
s
l
+1
  t
s
l
k  ! 0, s  !1. Then t
s
l
+1
 ! t

and from
t
s
l
+1
= (1  
s
l
)t
s
l
+ 
s
l
I(t
s
l
)
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it follows
t

= I(t

):
By Theorem 2.2 t

is the equilibrium income vector of the original model (1)-(6). 2
The proposition provides a tool to select a subsequence of points converging to an equi-
librium. But in general, there may be no such subsequences t
s
l
satisfying the conditions
of this proposition.
In the following three cases 
s
=  > 0 and matrices A(y); y 2 Y (t) do not depend
on y. Then process (47)-(48) becomes a standard homogeneous Markov chain with well
known conditions of convergence to a stable distribution (see Gantmaher [5]).
Case 1. Consider an exchange economy, i.e. g
i
(y
i
) = 0, i = 1; : : : ; l. Then matrix
A(y); y 2 Y (t
s
) is constant and has the form
A =
0
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
@
P
n
j=1
w
1j
W
i

1j
P
n
j=1
w
1j
W
j

2j
: : :
P
n
j=1
w
1j
W
j

mj
P
n
j=1
w
2j
W
j

1j
P
n
j=1
w
2j
W
j

2j
: : :
P
n
j=1
w
2j
W
j

mj
: : : : : : : : : : : :
P
n
j=1
w
mj
W
j

1j
P
n
j=1
w
mj
W
j

2j
: : :
P
n
j=1
w
mj
W
j

mj
1
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
A
:
Case 2. If levels of productions are xed, i.e. Y consists of a single point, then
A(y
s
); y
s
2 Y is also constant and has the form (43).
Case 3. Suppose that

pi
= 
p
; i = 1; : : : ; l;
W
j
> 0 and G
j
(y) = 0 for j = 1; : : : ; n
0
;
W
j
= 0 and G
j
(y
0
) > 0 for j = n
0
+ 1; : : : ; n and some y
0
2 Y
(in particular we may have W
j
= 0 for all j = 1; : : : ; n), i.e. each good is either produced
(but not available as endowment) or not produced (but available as endowment) in the
economy. Then matrix A(y) is also constant and has the form
A =
0
B
B
B
B
B
@
P
n
0
j=1
w
1j
W
j

1j
+ 
1
P
n
j=n
0
+1

1j
: : :
P
n
0
j=1
w
1j
W
j

mj
+ 
1
P
n
j=n
0
+1

mj
: : : : : : : : :
P
n
0
j=1
w
mj
W
j

1j
+ 
m
P
n
j=n
0
+1

1j
: : :
P
n
0
j=1
w
mj
W
j

mj
+ 
m
P
n
j=n
0
+1

mj
1
C
C
C
C
C
A
:
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Lemma 5.1 Let either of Cases 1, 2 or 3 apply, 
s
=  > 0, and thus matrix A(y
s
) = A
be constant. If A has a positive row, then A = (1   )E + A is stable with maximum
eigenvalue 
A
= 1, so
lim
s!1
t
s+1
= lim
s!1
A
s
t
0
= t
A
;
where t
A
is a single eigenvector of A corresponding 
A
= 1:
At
A
= t
A
:
Then At
A
= t
A
and by Theorem 2.2 t
A
is an equilibrium income vector.
Example (continued, from section 4). In this example matrix A is constant (as in
Case 1) and equals to
A =
0
B
@
1 3=4
0 1=4
1
C
A
:
It has a unique eigenvector t
A
= (1; 0)
T
,
P
m
k=1
(t
A
)
k
= 1, corresponding to the maximal
eigenvalue 1. Sequence t
s+1
= At
s
, starting from any initial point t
0
,
P
m
k=1
t
0
k
= 1, very
quickly converges to t
A
.
6 Concluding remarks
In this article we have indicated only some convergence properties of the joint maxi-
mization method and related issues. In particular we demonstrate that even the case
of Cobb-Douglas utility functions leads to a new type of problems for inhomogeneous
Markov processes, where the time dependence of the transition matrix is endogenously
generated by the probability distribution of its current states. It is worth mentioning
that the convergence of the joint maximization method does not require the gross sub-
stitutability assumptions to be met. Further convergence analysis requires more in-depth
study of the mapping I(t) and matrix A(y) in (42), (43).
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